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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Secretary of Interior (Secretary), Bruce Babbitt, proposed
reintroducing grizzly bears into the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness as a
nonessential,' experimental2 population under the Endangered Species Act
*. J.D. 1998, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT. This article began as a
memorandum for my former boss, Thomas M. France, Senior Legal Counsel for the National Wildlife
Federation in the Missoula, Montana office. I owe Tom a sincere and special thanks for his contribu-
tions to this article, including his editorial comments and support. A very special thanks is also owed
to Professor Rick Bales who edited this article and encouraged me submit it for publication. Professor
Bales is now teaching at Chase Law School, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, Ken-
tucky. Thanks also to the interns at the National Wildlife Federation office in Missoula for their initial
research contributions, and to everyone else who edited and commented on this article.
1. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539()(2)(B) (1994) (providing that before the Secretary may authorize the
release of an experimental population of a threatened or endangered species, he shall by regulation
identify the population and determine, based on the best information available, whether or not such
experimental population is "essential to the continued existence" of such threatened or endangered spe-
cies).
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(1) (1994) (providing that an "experimental population" means any
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(ESA)3. Grizzly bears were listed as a "threatened"4 species under the
ESA in 1975.' The grizzly's range once stretched from Canada to Mexi-
co. An estimated 50,000 grizzlies roamed the American west before Eu-
ropean settlement6. Today, grizzlies occupy only about 2% of their origi-
nal range, and only about 800 to 1,000 grizzlies are left in a few isolated
populations in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming and Washington.7 To reverse
this trend, the Secretary has proposed reintroducing grizzlies to reestablish
a viable grizzly population in the Bitterroot ecosystem that spans the Ida-
ho-Montana border.8 Under his proposal, a Citizen Management Commit-
tee (CMC) would be appointed to oversee the reintroduction effort.9
The proposed reintroduction of grizzlies is extremely controversial
because grizzlies are perceived by some as being dangerous to humans
and as posing a threat to livestock and, therefore, the welfare of the ranch-
ing and agricultural communities."° The use of a CMC to oversee the
reintroduction of grizzlies into the Selway-Bitterroot has also come under
heavy fire." Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho), Idaho Governor
Phil Batt, other Idaho congressional delegates, and Idaho state and local
government officials expressed concern as to whether the Secretary has the
legal authority under the ESA to delegate his management responsibilities
to a Citizen Management Committee. 2 However, a close look at the ESA
and its legislative history indicates that using tools such as a CMC are
indeed sanctioned by Congress. While there have been no cases directly
construing the establishment of a CMC under the ESA, applicable prece-
dent on the subdelegation of authority by agencies supports the regulation
population authorized for release under subsection (2) which is located in a completely separate geo-
graphical area from any nonexperimental populations, that is, it must be outside the current range of
the nonexperimental population).
3. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Proposed Establishment of a Nonessential
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area of Idaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg.
35,762 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17) (proposed July 2, 1997).
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994) (defining "threatened species" as any species likely to
become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a major part of its range. Endan-
gered" means that a species is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range).
5. Under 16 U.S.C. §1533(d), the Secretary "shall issue such regulations as he deems neces-
sary" to provide for the conservation of threatened species; he may propose the same prohibitions set
forth for endangered species under 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1).
6. 62 Fed. Reg. 35,763.
7. Id. at 35,763.
8. Id. at 35,764-765.
9. Id. at 35,766.
10. See, e.g., Dan Whipple, Grizzly Details: Local Management of Bear Reintroduction Draws
Fire, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, Dec. 11, 1997, at B 1.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Fredreka Schouten, Idaho Officials Tell Congress: No Grizzlies, IDAHO
STATESMAN, June 13, 1997, at Al.
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developed by the Department of Interior. 3
The question of whether the use of a Citizen Management Committee
to oversee the grizzly reintroduction effort is a proper exercise of the
Secretary of the Interior's authority under the ESA turns on an analysis of
the extent of the Secretary's discretion under the ESA and an application
of the subdelegation doctrine. Part I of this article provides a general
background discussion of the Citizen Management Committee and how
Committee fits into the overall statutory scheme of the ESA. Part II sets
out the subdelegation doctrine and discusses cases applying the doctrine.
Part IV applies case law construing the subdelegation doctrine to the Citi-
zen Management Committee proposal. Finally, this article concludes that
use of a Citizen Management Committee by the Secretary is entirely con-
sistent with the ESA, and is a proper subdelegation of authority from the
Secretary to an eligible private-public entity.
IX. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE ADDITION OF SECTION
10(J) AS A FLEXIBLE CONSERVATION TOOL
Under the ESA, Congress charged the Secretary of Interior with the
duty to conserve endangered and threatened species, and granted the Sec-
retary expansive powers to achieve this goal.'4 The ESA defines "conser-
vation" as the use of "all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which
the measures provided" under the ESA are no longer needed.' 5 As the
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, an "examination of the language, his-
tory and structure" of the ESA "indicates beyond doubt, that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." 6
The Secretary's powers are defined by several specific provisions
found in the ESA. Section 7(a)(1) requires the Secretary to use his author-
ity to carry out programs for the "conservation" of listed species.'7 The
ESA expressly provides that "conservation" includes transplantation as a
means of promoting species recovery.'8 The above provisions comple-
ment the section 10(j) experimental population provision, and provide the
Secretary with extensive powers to reintroduce species under circumstanc-
13. See, e.g., Pistachio Group of the Ass'n of Food Industries v. United States, 671 F. Supp.
31, 36 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
16. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). In addition to the ESA, the
Secretary has ample authority under other statutes to import and relocate species. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §
742f(a)(4) (1994) (listing general powers of Secretaries of Interior and Commerce); 16 U.S.C. § 661
(1994) (authorizing Secretary of Interior to protect and preserve fish and wildlife in general).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
18. § 1532(3).
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es that, in the expert judgment of the Secretary, are considered best for the
species.
A. The Addition of Section 10(j)
In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to include Section 10j), the
experimental population provision. 9 As the legislative history behind this
amendment reveals, Congress recognized that reintroduction programs
were a valuable wildlife management tool and sought to encourage their
use in recovering threatened and endangered species." As an incentive
for reintroduction efforts, Congress directed that nonessential experimental
populations be treated as "threatened species," with no requirement that
federal agencies consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
under section 7, and no requirement that USFWS designate critical habitat
under section 4.2 In exempting nonessential, experimental populations
from the Section 7 consultation and "no jeopardy"2 provisions and from
the Section 4 requirement to designate critical habitat for threatened and
endangered species, Congress hoped to "make the ESA a more efficient
conservation tool. 2
3
B. The Citizen Management Committee Proposal
Under the authority of the ESA, Section 10(), Secretary Babbitt
proposed the reintroduction of grizzly bears into the Selway-Bitterroot
Wilderness as a nonessential, experimental population.24 Section 10(a) of
the ESA empowers the Secretary to write specific regulations explaining
how reintroduced populations will be managed.' For grizzly bear reintro-
duction into the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, the Secretary proposes to
establish a fifteen-member Citizen Management Committee (CMC), which
is to be appointed after receiving recommendations from the Governors of
19. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304 (1982).
20. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97' Cong., 2d Sess., at 33 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2808.
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C) (1994); cf 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(2), 1536(a) (1994). Section
4 requires designation of critical habitat concurrent with the listing of any species as threatened or
endangered, while Section 7 requires interagency consultation on all federal projects where there is
reason to believe that threatened or endangered species may be present in the proposed project area
and where the proposed action is likely to affect such species.
22. Pursuant to § 7(a)(2), all federal agencies are required to insure that any action "authorized,
funded or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any"
endangered or threatened species "or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species which is ... determined to be critical ... 
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
23. H.R. REP. No. 567, at 8.
24. 62 Fed. Reg. 35,762.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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Montana and Idaho and affected Indian tribes.26 The Secretary of Agri-
culture and the Secretary of Interior would also each appoint a member.27
Once appointed, the CMC would have the authority to develop man-
agement plans, oversee the activities of the state fish and wildlife agencies
working on the grizzly program, and otherwise exercise power and author-
ity on behalf of the Secretary for the grizzly reintroduction effort.' The
proposed rule expressly provides that all decisions must lead toward re-
covery of the grizzly, be in accordance with the ESA, be based on the best
scientific and commercial data available, and minimize social and econom-
ic impacts.29 The proposed rule also provides that the Secretary shall re-
view a two-year work plan submitted by the committee outlining the
CMC's policy direction for the reintroduction effort.3" Moreover, the Sec-
retary can reassume management authority if the Secretary finds that the
decisions of the committee are not leading to grizzly recovery.3' As dis-
cussed below, Section 10, when combined with other provisions of the
ESA, strongly supports the Secretary's use of the CMC.
C. How Section lO(j) Fits Into the Overall ESA Scheme
Section 100) does not speak to whether a citizen management com-
mittee may oversee an experimental population program.32 However,
when Section 10 (j) is coupled with the Secretary's broad powers under
the ESA and the congressional intention that the Secretary develop special
programs to address the "particular" needs of reintroduced populations, it
creates a strong presumption that Congress granted the Secretary sufficient
discretion to establish such a management scheme.33 This presumption is
buttressed by how Section 10(j) works within the context of the entire
ESA.
Under Section 10(j), experimental populations are treated as threat-
ened species.'M While the ESA contains many prescriptive requirements
for the management of endangered species, the law vests the Secretary
with broad authority to conserve threatened species stating: "[T]he Secre-
tary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to
provide for the conservation of such species."35 The Secretary may use
26. 62 Fed. Reg. 35,770.
27. IL
28. Id.
29. L.
30. IL at 35,772.
31. Ia.
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (1994).
33. See §§ 1531-1539; H. R. REP. No. 567, at 8.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C) (1994).
35. § 1533(d).
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"all methods and procedures" necessary to conserve both threatened spe-
cies and nonessential experimental populations. The establishment of a
citizen management committee is certainly a "method" for conserving
grizzly bears in the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness.
The use of a CMC for grizzly bear recovery in the Selway-Bitterroot
is further bolstered by the latitude given the Secretary for protecting
"threatened" species under Section 4(d).
D. ESA Section 4 Rules for Protecting Threatened Species
As discussed above, Section 10(j) provides that experimental popula-
tions are treated as "threatened" species. Section 4(d) is the ESA provision
providing protection for "threatened" species, and allows the Secretary
great flexibility in protecting them.36 Nothing in Section 4 bars the Secre-
tary from delegating authority to others, and in fact several examples exist
in which the Secretary has delegated to states the authority to establish the
rules applicable to the taking of threatened species.37 Using a CMC to
oversee the Selway-Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction program is not sub-
stantially different from giving states oversight of conservation programs,
especially where, as here, the affected states and Indian tribes would be
appointing most of the CMC members. Therefore, use of a CMC most
likely is a valid method for overseeing the Selway-Bitterroot Grizzly rein-
troduction.
Moreover, Section 4 contains other provisions that further empower
the Secretary. Beyond the ESA's experimental population provision and
broad grant of authority to the Secretary, Congress, through Section 4(f),
explicitly authorized the Secretary to utilize individuals and organizations
outside of the Department of Interior in implementing the law.38 Section
4(f)(2) states that the Secretary, "in developing and implementing recovery
plans, may procure the services of appropriate public and private agencies,
institutions, and other qualified persons."39 Delegation of primary over-
sight responsibility to a CMC for recovering the Selway-Bitterroot grizzly
population seems to fall well within the Secretary's authority under Sec-
tion 4. Given that Section 4 expressly contemplates the use of qualified
public and private entities and persons in recovering threatened and endan-
gered species, the use of a CMC is a logical proposal.
However, because the grizzly reintroduction effort is controversial,
and use of a CMC has been attacked by various opponents of the reintro-
36. § 1533(d) (1994).
37. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) (1998) (providing that Utah prairie dogs, a threatened spe-
cies, may be taken on private lands in accordance with Utah state laws).
38. § 1533(f)(2) (1994).
39. § 1533(f)(2).
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duction effort,' a legal challenge to the validity of the Secretary's con-
clusion that the use of a CMC would achieve the goal of grizzly
conservation is possible.4 ' However, because the relevant provisions of
the ESA confer extensive authority upon the Secretary to conserve and
recover endangered and threatened species, there have been very few
challenges to rules promulgated under Section 4(d). Not only is the Secre-
tary commanded to conserve threatened and endangered species, Congress
provided the Secretary with the discretion to write specific regulations for
the management of reintroduced populations. The Secretary is empowered
to issue "necessary and advisable" regulations for protecting "threatened"
species, and may procure the services of appropriate public and private
entities in recovering threatened species. Taken together, the provisions of
the ESA create a presumption that the Secretary has the discretion to
employ a CMC for the Selway-Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction program.
II. SUBDELEGATION OF AumoRrTY AND THE USE OF A CMC
In addition to involving the issues discussed above, the use of a Citi-
zen Management Committee implicates the doctrine of subdelegation of
authority, which is a subset of the nondelegation doctrine. The
nondelegation doctrine arises out of Article 1, sec. 1 of the United States
Constitution, providing that only Congress, not the executive or judicial
branches of government, is vested with legislative power.42 Essentially,
the doctrine embraces the concept of the separation of powers. The U.S.
Supreme Court fleshed out the issue in 1892 when it proclaimed that
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the executive branch be-
cause doing so would undermine the structural integrity of our system of
government as set forth in the Constitution.43
It follows then, that Congress may not delegate legislative power to
an executive branch agency head; Congress does, however, routinely dele-
gate to an agency head the power to administer and carry out laws. The
question then becomes whether an agency head may properly "subdele-
gate" to subordinates the authority given him or her by Congress without
over-stepping that authority and invoking separation of powers con-
cerns." Certainly, vesting management authority in a CMC would be a
subdelegation of authority by the Secretary of the Interior. As discussed
40. See, e.g., Whipple, supra note 10, at B1.
41. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994). Section 4(d) rules issued for threatened species
must be based upon an administrative record.
42. RONALD A. CAss ET AL., ADMImSTRATIVE LAW 19 (2d ed. 1994).
43. Id., citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
44. "Subdelegation" is the transmission of authority by agency heads to subordinates. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExr § 9.01 (3d ed. 1972)
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infra, however, case law clearly indicates that in many instances the sub-
delegation of authority is proper.
No specific cases exist with which to evaluate use of the CMC by the
Secretary under the proposed regulations. In similar situations, however,
both Congress and the courts have recognized the need for agency and de-
partment heads to subdelegate some of their duties, especially where, as
here, the agency oversees a complex regulatory scheme. In fact, unless
subdelegation by an agency or department head is specifically forbidden
by statute, it is typically upheld by courts.
Courts apply two criteria in evaluating the validity of agency subdele-
gation. First the subdelegation of authority must be consistent with the
statute; second, the delegating authority must retain oversight. Subdelega-
tion to both public and private entities is generally sanctioned by courts
where oversight or final approval is retained by the agency head.a" In
other words, the subdelegating agency head cannot surrender totally his or
her authority to a public or private entity.46 Courts may even find that no
subdelegation occurred at all where a delegating agency retains oversight
authority, where guidance standards exist, and where there are no conflicts
of interest. 7
The following cases illustrate how courts determine whether subdele-
gation is proper. Courts have generally focused on whether power was
being delegated to a public agency, a public-private agency or a fully
private entity. While courts have limited the authority to subdelegate de-
pending on whether the subdelegation was to a public, private or public-
private entity, the key, as mentioned above, is the level of oversight re-
tained by the delegating agency and the review available.
A. Subdelegation to Public Entities
When an agency subdelegates authority within the agency itself or to
another public agency and that subdelegation is expressly authorized in the
statute, it is presumed legitimate. Moreover, courts have held that express
statutory authority for subdelegation is not necessary where it is not spe-
cifically prohibited by Congress. Courts have recognized the weighty
reality of administering statutes such as the ESA and allowed for subdele-
gation when it was consistent with the statute.
For example, in Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman,4"
45. See, e.g., Pistachio, 671 F.Supp. 31; Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88
F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. New York City, 697
F.Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
46. See cases cited supra note 45.
47. See infra Part III(D).
48. 88 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1996)
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that delegation in general
does not have to be expressly provided for in the statute.49 Moreover, the
court noted that delegations which are not inconsistent with the purpose of
the statute are generally allowed." Inland Empire addressed, among other
issues, the issue of whether the Secretary of Agriculture needed to person-
ally authorize salvage timber sales in the Kootenai National Forest, or
whether he could delegate such authority to the Forest Service." The
court stated that where Congress did not expressly authorize a subdelega-
tion, the purpose of the statute must be examined to set its parameters.5 2
The court recognized that requiring the Secretary to personally authorize
every timber sale would contradict the Rescissions Act, the goal of which
was to expedite salvage timber sales. 3 Accordingly, the court held that
the Secretary did not have to personally authorize each timber sale, but
that he could properly subdelegate such authority to the Forest Service.'
Similarly, in Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. New
York City,'5 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York determined that the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) had the authority to delegate certain duties under the Clean Air
Act to New York City for a downtown Brooklyn revitalization project."
In making its determination, the court looked to Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974,' 7 which states in relevant part
that:
In order to assure that the policies of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 and other provisions of law which further the purposes of
such Act (as specified in the regulations issued by the Secretary) are
most effectively implemented.., and to assure to the public undimin-
ished protection of the environment, the Secretary, in lieu of the environ-
mental protection procedures otherwise applicable, may under regulations
provide for the release of funds for particular projects to recipients of
assistance under this chapter who assume all of the responsibilities for
environmental review, decision-making, and action pursuant to such
Act .... 58
49. ld. at 702 (quoting Loma Linda Univ. v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1983)).
50. Ld. (quoting National Ass'n of Psychiatric Treatment Centers for Children v. Mendez, 857
F.Supp. 85, 91 (D.D.C. 1994)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d
782, 795 (9th Cir. 1986)).
53. 1& at 702.
54. Id. at 703.
55. 697 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
56. Id. at 671-72.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(g)(1).
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The court stated that:
Although HUD's authority to delegate under § 104(f) has consistently
been upheld despite challenges that such delegation frustrates Congres-
sional intent in passing environmental statutes ... no court appears to
have considered whether the affirmative responsibilities of federal agen-
cies articulated in § 176(c) of the Clean Air Act can be delegated. How-
ever, based on the legislative history of § 5304, regulations subsequently
adopted, and the reasoning of case law upholding HUD's delegation of
other environmental responsibilities, it appears that the duties of § 176(c)
are delegable. 9
The court found that the Congressional Conference Report and the
regulations adopted reflected a clear intent "to enable HUD to delegate
responsibilities arising under the Clean Air Act."' The court also noted
that HUD's authority to delegate was not without limitation.6' However,
because the court was deciding a motion to dismiss, the court did not
reach the issue of the extent or nature of HUD's authority to delegate.
Atlantic Terminal does illustrate that agencies, when authorized by Con-
gress, may properly delegate authority to other public agencies. However,
such subdelegations to public entities must not be prohibited by, and must
be consistent with, the statute.
B. Subdelegation to Private/Public Entities
Courts have also upheld subdelegations of authority to public/private
entities. The Court of International Trade, in deciding Pistachio Group of
the Ass'n of Food Industries v. United States, observed that subdelegations
of authority within agencies have been readily accepted.62 At issue in
Pistachio was not whether the International Trade Administration (ITA)
had the authority to subdelegate some of its duties, but whether the ITA
could delegate all of its authority to the New York Federal Reserve Bank
(NY Fed.) to determine the appropriate exchange rate to be applied in
carrying out anti-dumping laws.63 The Pistachio court acknowledged that
the ITA had the authority to subdelegate some of its authority to the NY
Fed., but only if the NY Fed. were ultimately subject to some form of
scrutiny from the ITA.6 The court further recognized that the ITA's reli-
ance on the NY Fed. reduced the administrative burden on the ITA and
59. Atlantic Terminal, 697 F. Supp. at 671.
60. Id. at 672.
61. Id.
62. Pistachio, 671 F. Supp at 35.
63. Id.
64. Pistachio, 671 F. Supp. at 38.
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that, therefore, the ITA regulation authorizing the use of the NY Fed.,
generally, was reasonable.65
However, the Pistachio court noted that a potential problem existed
in the case before it, that problem being the fact that the ITA relied com-
pletely on the NY Fed. to determine anti-dumping exchange rates. The NY
Fed. is not a wholly public agency, even though the NY Fed. board mem-
bers are appointed by the President upon the advice and consent of the
Senate for fixed terms.' The Pistachio court observed that:
The New York Fed is part of the national Federal Reserve System and
subject to supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, but it is also a private corporation whose stock is owned by the
member commercial banks within its district.67
In short, the NY Fed is a public-private entity.
The court stated that even though authority to delegate was not ex-
plicitly granted in any statute, courts have "generally upheld similar dele-
gations particularly where, as here, the agency is charged with the admin-
istration of a complex regulatory program."6" The court concluded, how-
ever, that subdelegations of significant functions require some form of re-
view, be it by the agency itself or ultimately by the courts.69
In discussing the frequency of approval of intra-agency
subdelegations, the Pistachio court noted that there is an expanding sense
"that agencies should be given broader authority to develop procedures
and standards necessary for their proper functioning."'7 The court further
observed that in cases of statutory delegations, there has been an increase
in administrative and judicial controls on administrative behavior, and that
"comparable measures provide an appropriate check on transferred powers
in the area of subdelegation." '
The Pistachio court concluded that the ITA could subdelegate author-
ity to the NY Fed., a public-private entity, to help determine what ex-
change rate should be applied in carrying out anti-dumping laws, but that
the ITA erred in failing to even consider what that exchange rate should
be.72 Thus, the ITA impermissibly subdelegated its authority to the NY
65. Id. at 37.
66. l& at 35 n.4. Officers of the N.Y. Fed. are appointed through a combination of actions by
the Federal Reserve Board and the member Banks. Id
67. Id at 35.
68. Id at 34.
69. Id. at 36.
70. Id at40n.8.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 36.
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Fed.73 The ITA was permitted to subdelegate authority to a public-private
entity, but only so long as it retained oversight authority.
Following similar logic, where final decision-making power did re-
main with the delegating agency, a subdelegation to a private entity by a
quasi-public body has been upheld. In Simon v. Cameron, the court upheld
the subdelegation of authority to a private, voluntary health planning agen-
cy by the Health Planning Council, a governmental entity.74 The Health
Planning Council was characterized by the court as being a:
[Q]uasi-public body, created by the legislature, whose members are ap-
pointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Governor, the Chairman of
the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly. Thus,
final decision making authority is vested in this quasi-public body, not in
the local planning body.7"
The court upheld the subdelegation to the voluntary planning agency,
because final decision-making authority rested with the Health Planning
Council.76
The above cases indicate that subdelegation of authority by an agency
to a public-private entity such as the CMC may be valid if appropriate
procedures are followed.
C. Subdelegation to Private Entities
The existence of guidance standards set by the delegating agency is a
significant factor in determining whether a subdelegation to a private
entity is proper. Generally, where courts find subdelegation improper, it is
for lack of oversight and review. Where an agency subdelegates public
duties to private entities, the potential for conflicts of interest exists. In
cases of subdelegation to private entities, therefore, courts generally scruti-
nize the subdelegation more carefully.
Although Sierra Club v. Sigler states that agencies may not delegate
all of their authority to a private entity, the case illustrates that administra-
tive agencies may delegate some duties to private entities, as long as the
objectivity of those private entities may not be questioned on the grounds
of a conflict of interest.77 In Sierra Club, an EIS was prepared primarily
by a private consulting firm that had a stake in a proposed project to ex-
tend and deepen the channel connecting Galveston Bay with the Gulf of
73. Id.
74. 337 F. Supp. 1380, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
75. Id.
76. Id.; accord United Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898 (D.D.C. 1972).
77. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962, 963 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Mexico on the Texas Gulf Coast.7" The purpose of the project was to
allow supertankers transporting oil to navigate further up the channel, and
the proposed project included construction of an oil terminal to off-load
supertankers.79 The Army Corps of Engineers was charged with permit-
ting the project prior to commencement of any dredging or construc-
tion.8" EIS preparation regulations required the Corps to independently
evaluate the information submitted regarding the EIS and to be responsible
for its accuracy."' The Sierra Club and other plaintiffs filed suit challeng-
ing the adequacy of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and
the permits issued by the Corps on the grounds that the Corps' decision-
making process violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and other statutes.8 2 Based upon the record regarding preparation of the
FEIS, the Court of Appeals determined that most of the FEIS preparation
had been done by a private consulting firm hired by the applicants. 3 Par-
ticularly troubling to the court was the fact that the private consulting firm
had a financial stake in the project.'
In recognition of the fact that the preparation of an EIS is a "mam-
moth task," NEPA regulations allow private contractors and consultants to
participate in EIS preparation. 5 However, the regulations require contrac-
tors participating in EIS preparation to execute a disclosure statement
verifying that they had no financial interest in the outcome of the pro-
ject. 6 This disclosure statement was designed to minimize conflicts of
interest.8 7 The court stated that although conflicts of interest were not of
themselves illegal, the Corp's "rubber-stamping of a consultant-prepared
FEIS" would be unacceptable. 8
Despite the problems it found with the FEIS in question, the Sierra
Club court appreciated that NEPA regulations recognized "the reality that
private consultants play an important, if sometimes troubling, role in mod-
em government." 9 Furthermore, noted the court, administrative agencies
78. Id1 at 961-62.
79. Id.
80. L. at 962 n.i.
81. Id. at 962 n.3.
82. Id. at 963-64.
83. Id. at 963 n.3.
84. lId
85. Id. at 962 n.3.
86. 33 C.F.R § 1506.500.
87. Id.
88. d. (citing Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1974) (permitting a "financial-
ly interested private contractor" to participate in EIS preparation, but barring agency abdication of its
duties by "reflexively rubber-stamping a statement prepared by others") (citations omitted).
89. It.
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do have discretion in performing their duties.9"
The court, although it sent the FEIS back to the agency, did not reach
the question of whether the Corps had improperly rubber-stamped the
FEIS, as that was not an issue on appeal, but the court did counsel caution
in the future.9" The court held that the Corps "must rework the FEIS to
correct the deficiencies ... and must reconsider its permit decision in light
of the rewritten FEIS. 'g Sigler illustrates that partial subdelegations to
private entities can be valid so long as the agency does not delegate away
its duties under a particular statute by "rubber-stamping" what a private
entity has done and so long as caution is used where potential conflicts of
interest may arise.
D. Cases in Which Courts Have Found no Subdelegation Has Occurred
Some courts may conclude that no subdelegation has occurred be-
cause of the availability of judicial and administrative review.93 The Pis-
tachio court illuminated the difficult issues with which courts must grapple
in deciding subdelegation cases by stating:
[C]ourts may avoid answering difficult separation of powers and related
questions or objections to the degree of power transferred. Regardless of
whether the easier or more difficult analytical course is followed, the
court's conclusion ultimately must depend, in part, on the type of review
provided.94
In Perot v. Federal Election Commission,95 the Federal Court of Ap-
peals found that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) did not delegate
any of its authority to sponsor candidate debates in permitting nonprofit
organizations to stage such debates.96 In Perot, Ross Perot and other can-
didates who were not invited to participate in televised presidential debates
sponsored by the Commission on Presidential Debates, a non-profit orga-
nization, sought to enjoin the debates or require the FEC to take action re-
garding their complaints. 97 Perot asserted that the FEC unlawfully dele-
gated legislative authority to a private, nonprofit corporation in violation
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 984.
93. Pistachio, 671 F. Supp. at 39.
94. Id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding
no subdelegation occurred where the agency retained ultimate decision-making authority under its
regulations).
95. Perot v. Federal Election Commission, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
96. Id. at 559.
97. Id. at 555.
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of the U.S. Constitution.9" Perot's argument rested on wording in a Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act (FECA) implementing regulation which pro-
vided that nonprofit organizations were allowed to stage candidate debates
so long as "pre-established objective criteria" were employed in determin-
ing who could participate in candidate debates. 99
The court characterized Perot's argument as being one of subdelega-
tion of authority "since the claim is that Congress has delegated authority
to the FEC, which in turn has delegated some portion of that authority to
CPD."" The court initially observed that, "when Congress has specifi-
cally vested an agency with the authority to administer a statute, it may
not shift that responsibility to a private actor . ,,1.0 Ultimately, how-
ever, the court found that this was not a case of subdelegation of authority
because "preestablished objective criteria," as required by the FECA regu-
lation, were employed in determining who could participate in the de-
bates.'02
Other courts, as noted above, have taken the opposite analytical
course and found that a proper subdelegation occurred. 3 Depending up-
on the court, then, use of the CMC may or may not be deemed a subdele-
gation. In either event, case law illustrates that transferring authority to
private entities is proper so long as the agency head retains oversight,
establishes guidance standards, and no conflicts of interest exist. The criti-
cal elements in an application of the subdelegation doctrine to the CMC
then are whether subdelegation to the CMC is consistent with the goals of
the ESA, whether the Secretary retains sufficient review and oversight and
provides guidance standards, and whether conflicts of interest exist.'04
IV. APPLICATION OF THE SUBDELEGATION DOCTRINE TO THE PROPOSED
GRizzLy REINTRODUCTION PROGRAM
Under current law, the CMC provisions would survive attack from all
angles because: (1) subdelegation of authority is lawful; (2) the goals and
duties of the CMC are not inconsistent with the goals of the ESA; (3) the
oversight provisions and guidance standards are more than adequate to
survive judicial scrutiny; and (4) the CMC is organized to avoid conflicts
98. Id.
99. Id at 559-560.
100. Id. at 559.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 702-703; Atlantic Terminal, 697 F. Supp. at 672; Simon
v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D. Cal. 1970).
104. See generally Pistachio, 671 F. Supp. at 31; Simon, 337 F.Supp. at 1380; Sierra Club, 695
F.2d at 957.
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of interest.
First, subdelegation of authority to a public entity, public-private
entity, or fully private entity is lawful. The CMC is an appointed entity
serving set terms, yet comprised in part of private individuals with varying
interests." 5 Therefore, it is probably best characterized as a quasi-public
entity. However, characterization of the CMC probably is not critical in
light of case law upholding subdelegation to all three of the above-men-
tioned types of entities.
Second, subdelegation to the CMC is not inconsistent with the ESA
because the goals of the CMC are to "[d]evelop management plans and
policies, as necessary for the management of grizzly bears in the Experi-
mental Area" so that "[s]uch management plans and policies will be in
accordance with applicable state and federal laws."'" Moreover, the ESA
does not expressly forbid subdelegation of responsibilities in furthering the
goals of the Act.0 7 Inland Empire, Atlantic Terminal and related cases,
as discussed above, indicate that where subdelegation is not inconsistent
with a statute, subdelegation may be appropriate. Furthermore, where an
agency, such as the Department of the Interior, is charged with the admin-
istration of a complex regulatory program, such as the ESA, courts recog-
nize that subdelegation may be necessary." 8
Third, the proposed rule provides for ample oversight of the CMC's
activities by the Secretary of the Interior."° Pistachio and related cases
indicate that subdelegation to an eligible private or private-public entity
may be proper where oversight is retained by the subdelegating agency.
Here, the proposed rule states that the Secretary will retain final responsi-
bility for the grizzly reintroduction effort and may reassume responsibility
if he finds that the CMC actions are not leading to recovery of the grizzly
bear."0 Thus, the Secretary's subdelegation to the CMC most likely is
proper.
Additionally, the Perot court concluded that the FEC did not subdele-
gate its authority at all where the agency did nothing more than permit
eligible private entities to use their own discretion in determining how best
to comply with the agency's regulations."' Here Section 17.84(j)(12)(ii)
105. See 62 Fed. Reg. 35,766.
106. Id. at 35,771.
107. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
108. See Pistachio, 671 F. Supp. at 36 n.8 (noting "the increasing frequency with which intra-
agency subdelegations of authority have been approved" and that the development reflects "a growing
sense that agencies should be given broader authority to develop procedures and standards necessary
for their proper functioning.")
109. See 62 Fed. Reg. 35,763-68.
110. Id. at 35,766.
111. Perot, 97 F.3d at 559 (finding acceptable regulation that allowed eligible non-profits to
develop their own "preestablished objective criteria" in determining who might participate in Presiden-
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of the proposed rule sets forth detailed standards with which the CMC
must comply in exercising its authority. 12 As such, the proposed rule
satisfies the oversight and guidance criteria set forth in case law and
should be seen as a proper subdelegation of authority from the Secretary
to the CMC, or no subdelegation at all. The fact that the CMC has some
discretion to determine how it must comply with those standards does not
necessarily suggest, as stated in Perot, that a subdelegation has in fact
actually occurred.
Lastly, the CMC is organized to allow people with a broad spectrum
of interests to have a voice in the reintroduction management effort, there-
by minimizing conflicts of interest.1 The proposed rule provides that
the CMC shall be composed of members who are nominated by the gover-
nors of Idaho, Montana, the Nez Perce Tribe, the U.S. Forest Service, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and state fish and wildlife agencies. 4
Additional safeguards are built in which call for, among other things,
public participation in the form of review and comment on CMC deci-
sions, the requirement that the CMC give full consideration to comments
and opinions from the various federal and state agencies and the Nez
Perce Tribe.1 5 All of these provisions show that the CMC will be well-
balanced and protected from conflicts of interest. In sum, the CMC provi-
sions of the proposed rule should easily survive judicial scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed rule and its CMC provisions are entirely consistent
with congressional intent set forth in the ESA: to conserve endangered and
threatened species and to pursue avenues for their recovery. The use of a
CMC will aid the Secretary in the huge task of implementing the ESA.
However, the Secretary will retain ultimate authority and responsibility. At
a time when government expenditures are being increasingly scrutinized,
the innovative use of an uncompensated, highly motivated group of indi-
viduals to develop and implement the recovery of the grizzly bear is not
only consistent with the ESA and existing case law, but is also logical and
sound.
tial debates),
112. 62 Fed. Reg. 35,766-68.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 35,766.
115. Id.
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